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FINANCING DEVELOPMENT AND TAX STRUCTURE CHANGE IN THE USSR
The course of economic development produces significant and predictable
changes in government revenues. Transition from traditional agricultural
to modern industrial economy has involved, and may even require, differences
in both the types and incidence of various taxes. The dominant pattern,
according to Harley Hinrichs, involves three phases: first, reliance on
"traditional" direct (land and poll) taxes, then a shift toward greater use
of indirect levies (such as customs duties and excise taxes) , and finally
the relative growth of "modern" direct (income and profits) taxes as the
economy becomes industrialized. Plotted over development time, the historical
process may be portrayed by the ratio of direct to indirect taxes (D/I)
,
and the result is a shallow U-shaped curve, with underdeveloped and developed
stages at either terminus.
Hinrichs' analysis was based upon data for sixty non-socialist economies,
derived from the 19th as well as the 20th centuries. Socialist experiences
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with taxation, however, were not considered, and it is interesting to discover
that the pattern of tax structure change during the Soviet period conforms
to Hinrichs' model. The ratio of direct to indirect taxation for the
years 1924/25 through 1972—when the USSR was transformed from an agrarian
to an industrial economy— traces out the familiar U-shaped curve (Figure 1)
,
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with one relatively brief departure during World War II.
In order to compare socialist and non-socialist tax systems, we shall
address two questions. First, what were the specific historical reasons
for the changes in Soviet taxation? Second, to -what extent does the USSR
provide additional confirmation of Hinrichs' hypothesis about a systematic
nexus between tax structure (as represented by ,the D/l ratio) and level of

economic development? Our principal finding is that the Soviet experience
does confirm Hinrich's hypothesis in broad outline, although, of course, there
are specific differences in the Soviet case. Thus the historical behavior
of taxation adds another bit of evidence challenging the widely held notion
that the Soviet development pattern has been unique. Tax structure in the
USSR does indeed appear to be determined by level of development, although
cultural or ideological preferences and specific historical events (such as
WWII) have led to some divergences from the general model.
Consider Figure 1, which charts the D/l ratio for the Soviet Union
from 1924/25, the earliest date for which reasonably complete Soviet data
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are available. The pattern traced out by the ratio may be divided into
several distinct segments, ending in 1925/26, 1935, 1968, and in the current
period. The first phase, extending back to the revolution(s) of 1917 (off
the chart) , witnessed a sharp drop in direct taxation. Most traditional
direct taxes (primarily poll and land taxes) that had formed the backbone
of tsarist budgets were abolished or abrogated. Formal taxation as a whole
plummeted because of both economic dislocations (especially during the Civil
War of 1918-1921) and ideological biases against government taxes. In fact,
leading Bolshevik economic theorists explicitly argued for the deliberate
destruction of pecuniary institutions, including the budgetary system.
But by the close of the Civil War it became clear that no substitute for
money could be devised. The pressing need to finance economic reconstruction
and normalization led to the first serious efforts to control rampant inflation
and strengthen financial institutions.
Economic normalization included the introduction of Lenin's New Economic
Policy (NEP) , the rebuilding of the budgetary system, and the reimposition
of indirect taxes (e.g., excises on food and nonfood staples) as retail trade
resumed, leading to an ever greater reliance on indirect taxes. By the end

of the first period in 1925/26, the D/l ratio had dropped from a value greater
than .80 to .50.
It continued to decline during the next decade, reaching its nadir of
.15 by 1935. The overall revenue pattern in this second period involved a
relative growth of indirect excises and "industrial taxes" (a combined lamp-
sum license fee and a graduated le\'y on gross enterprise turnover) that came
to be the basic sources of budgetary revenues. Most direct taxes, on the
other hand, were used only to regulate (or eliminate) specific and ideologically
undesirable economic activities.
The predominance of excises, "Industrial taxes," and other indirect
levies stemmed from two advantages: one, they provided a generally steady
and predictable flow of receipts to the budget (especially important in view
of the slow development of budgetary institutions) and two, they were viewed
as relatively unobtrusive sources of revenue and therefore less of a political
liability for a government uncertain of popular support (especially among the
peasantry). In contrast, direct taxes on the population meant negative
political capital and in any event were difficult to assess and collect. They
were imposed primarily on private trade and production (for example, on gross
agricultural output) , and were increasingly differentiated over time so as
to maintain strict limits on the accumulation of wealth in the private sector.
The restricted tax base, coupled with poor reporting and compliance,
minimized the impact of these redistributlve direct taxes, and the state
budget actually collected more revenue by means of direct borrowing from the
population during the latter part of this second period than by direct taxes
on individuals. At the same tine, however, one other source of direct
taxation began to play a more prominent role. Although a small item at the
outset, deductions from the profits of socialized industry represented a

groiizing source of revenue, especially after the economy was fully nationalized
and set on a course of rapid industrialization.
Although the uses and importance of direct and indirect taxes were thus
already determined during the 1920s, the forms and rates of various taxes
shifted frequently as budgetary policy and financial institutions developed.
By the introduction of the First Five Year Plan in 1928, the revenue system
had proliferated into a cumbersome network of taxes—loopholes in one were
often remedied by creating another, a practice that increasingly complicated
and delayed revenue collections. At the same time, the budget assumed a
greatly expanded role in financing capital investment, thus increasing
pressure on the Finance Commissariat to collect revenues more quickly and
efficiently. To streamline revenues, a series of tax and non-tax payments
(including the old excises and "industrial taxes") were consolidated in 1930
into two basic sources: the turnover tax and profit withdrawals from socialist
enterprises. The first, levied as a percentage of trade turnover (primarily
on consumer goods) was by far the most important, accounting for an average
of 67% of budget revenues during the 1930s. Like previous indirect taxes,
it was relatively easily and quickly collected, and, more important, it
could be levied and paid independent of any short-term fluctuations in
production.
More narrowly differentiated than the turnover tax (which was initially
assessed by branch of production)
,
profit withdrawals served mainly to
Q
"equalize" net enterprise receipts within various branches of production.
These revenues, (treated here as a profit tax), were collected both as a
percentage of enterprise receipts and as a residual after all other deductions
from enterprise income had been paid out. Profit tax receipts thus depended

on enterprise success in meeting production plans, which made them difficult
to budget and less stable than the turnover tax. For these reasons, profit
taxes played a relatively minor role in the early decades of Soviet rule,
though after 1935 they actually came to dominate budget proceeds along with
the turnover tax.
Other forms of direct taxation raised only a small amount of revenue,
since they were viewed primarily as Instruments for restructuring production
or ownership and were not intended as revenue devices. Local taxes and fees
(mainly taxes on property and construction that went exclusively to local
budgets) were the main exceptions to this rule, and they grew steadily
throughout the first two Five Year Plans. They provided funds to finance
the expansion of local public services and apparently were intended, as
9
Davies observes, to be spend 'visibly" on local needs.
By the close of the second period (1935), Soviet budgetary institutions
were well-developed and the major current tax sources already dominated
budget revenues. In 1935 the D/l ratio stood at its lowest point ever in
Soviet history: 0.15. The turnover tax v/as by far the most important
source of revenue throughout the first two Five Year Plans, and in this
sense to it must be attributed the main credit for financing successful rapid
industrialization in the USSR. It is important to note that the incidence
of the turnover tax fell partly on the producer of agricultural products
(the collective farmers primarily) and partly on the (primarily urban) consumer
of these products. Sales of industrial consumer goods yielded little
turnover tax revenue, and industrial producer goods yielded even less.
Consequently, it is fair to say that it was trie rural and urban poor who bore
the brunt of financing investment during the first decade of rapid industrial-
ization.

The third period in our schema extends from 1936 to approximately 1968
—
shortly after the introduction of the 1965 "Kosygin reforms." This period
reveals a gradual but persistent shift from primary reliance upon indirect
taxation (especially the turnover tax) toward profit taxes (and to a lesser
extent, personal income taxes). As a result the D/I ratio rose from 0.15
in 1935, to its historical peak in the USSR of 1.45 in 1968.
The war years form an exception to this pattern. During WWII the upward
trend in the D/I ratio was greatly accelerated, reflecting the drop in
output and trade, the loss of territory, and the conversion of productive
capacity to wartime ends. Receipts from both profit withdrawals and the
turnover tax fell precipitously, but these losses were partially offset by
increases in direct taxes on and by direct borrowing from the population.
The regime increased the rates of income, agricultural and local taxes (by
as much as 100%), and imposed a war poll tax and a special levy on bachelors
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and families with few members.' As a result, direct taxes grew from 15.7%
of total revenue in 1938 to 27.6% in 1943. Meanwhile, indirect taxation
dropped from 69.1% to 36.2% of total budgetary proceeds. Net borrowing pro-
duced 13% of all revenues in 1943—up from an average of approximately 5%
13during the mid 1930s. As lending to the state was not really voluntary,
these funds ought properly to be regarded as additional direct taxation on
the population.
It is clear from Figure 1, however, that the war period was exceptional.
Postwar recovery restored the relative prominence of the turnover tax in
budgetary proceeds, and the more gradual prewar upward trend in the D/I
ratio was quickly reestablished after 1946. Basically, profit withdrawals
and personal income taxes grew more rapidly than the turnover tax. Profits

gradually assumed greater significance in the budgetary system after 1947
as a measure of and means for promoting enterprise efficiency, especially
in sectors that traditionally had been subsidized by the state. The new
emhpasis meant increases in wholesale prices and in transport rates that
tended to raise the net profits of beneficiary enterprises, thus increasing
profit withdrawals from sectors that previously contributed relatively little
budgetary revenue.
Direct personal income taxes also expanded following WIl as the
wage bill rose. The increase in revenues to the budget, however, was partly
offset by a reduction of direct taxes on collective and private agriculture
introduced by Stalin's heirs: the agricultural tax (basically, from the
mid-1950s, a tax on private plots) was gradually but consistently reduced
after 1953, and income taxes on collective farms were reduced after 1960.
At the same time, the turnover tax declined in importance. Its base narrowed
as retail prices were reduced (between 1947 and 1954) and agricultural
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procurement prices were raised (throughout the 1950s and 1960s).
The changing relative significance of the turnover and profit taxes
actually shifted the incidence of Soviet taxation. Given the relative con-
stancy of retail food prices and the rise in agricultural procurement prices,
effective rates of taxation on producers and consumers of agricultural products
declined throughout the third period. On the other hand, a general rise
in productivity meant increased profit margins for enterprises producing
non-food consumer goods. As retail prices in this branch stayed virtually
unchanged, profits were inflated (with allowance for some upward wage drift,
of course). Consequently, the rising D/l ratio in the USSR reflected a
changing incidence of taxation (which seems reason enough for treating the
turnover tax and profit withdrawals as distinct forms of taxation) .

Following the 1965 managerial reforms, the D/I ratio rose sharply. The
reforms placed even more emphasis on profitability, rather than gross output,
as the main standard for evaluating enterprise performance. One key element
shifted responsibility for financing most capital repairs and working capital
from the government budget to enterprises. As a result, the average rate
of deductions from profits paid into the budget declined from 70% in 1965
to 61% in 1969. At the same time a new round of price reforms (especially
in wholesale prices in 1967) increased the profit margin and further narrowed
the base of the turnover tax. In fact, 1967 marked a turning point in
budgetary revenues, when profit taxes actually exceeded proceeds from the
turnover tax for the first time in Soviet history.
Since 1968, the D/I ratio has leveled off, apparently breaking the
upward trend of period three. Provisionally, then, we can identify the years
since 1968 as a separate, fourth period, one in which the D/I ratio has
remained virtually constant at about 1.35. Dissatisfaction xaith the pace
and results of the Kosygin reforms has led to a tightening of control over
1 7profits and an increase in the share deducted into the budget. New price
reforms, moreover, have narrowed the enterprise profit margin and expanded
proceeds from the turnover tax. Yet in spite of the retrenchment, budget
revenues are still dominated by profits and by direct taxes in general, in
sharp contrast to the reliance on indirect taxation during the years of rapid
industrialization.
The Soviet experience leads to the conclusion that changes in taxation
have generally followed the pattern outlined by Hinrichs for developing
non-socialist countries, although some elements of the Soviet experience are
quite distinctive. For example, direct taxes on individuals and foreign
trade duties in the USSR suggest points of departure from the broad outline
of the Hinrichs model.

Direct taxes on the population had been defined by Bolshevik leaders
before the Revolution as a political weapon to expropriate the wealthy or
landowning strata. High rates of taxation would thus be used to further
class policies of the Soviet state, which automatically limited the revenue
potential of most forms of direct taxation. On one hand, widespread imposition
of income-related taxes on workers and peasants was avoided. On the other
hand, when direct taxes were employed, they tended in many cases to be
self-liquidating. -4s taxes on the "wealthier strata" (kulaks and private
entrepreneurs) inexorably increased in the 1920s and 1930s, they affected
fewer and fewer people: a 100% levy on private production virtually assured
the elimination of the tax base. Thus direct taxes during the "transitional"
phase of Soviet development were Jimited not only by the low levels of
income and compliance common to pre-industrial economies, but by political
bias as well.
The relative unimportance of customs duties has also diverged from the
predictions of the Hinrichs model. Although the growth of foreign trade
commonly provides a major source of indirect revenue during the middle or
transitional phase of development, Soviet policy explicitly minimized foreign
economic ties. Customs revenues thus provided a small share of budget
receipts. Their importance, however, is difficult to measure precisely,
since customs duties have been omitted from postwar Soviet budget accounts.
Indirectly, the relatively small proportion of foreign trade in current
national income (estimated at 6%) suggests that this source remains a minor
18
one.
The two elements of Soviet fiscal policy indicate the importance of
"cultural tradition" (as Hinrichs calls it) along with developmental influ-
ences in determining the sources and incidence of government revenues.
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Ideological and political constraints have made Soviet leaders reluctant
to impose substantial direct taxes on individuals or to rely on foreign trade
as a primary source of funds for development.
What Hinrichs calls the influence of "cultural tradition" on the level
of the D/I ratio might just as well be called irrationality from an economic
standpoint. In other words, the model can explain only the relative level
of the D/I ratio over time, not its absolute level. Soviet reluctance to
impose personal income tax rates comparable to those of the West appears
irrational in this same sense. The preference for direct taxes on profits
of socialist enterprises (profit withdrawals) reflects in part this decision
to avoid high personal income taxation, but it also reflects a political
fact. Experience both in the USSR and in Eastern Europe has shown the poli-
tical danger of raising retail prices, especially on food products. The
campaign to raise wholesale prices paid to farmers for agricultural products
during the 1950s and 1960s led, therefore, to a great reduction or disappear-
ance of the turnover tax margin, (In fact, some products are in fact sub-
sidized today, which is a kind of negative turnov^er tax.)
Of course, the Soviet leadership could have raised turnover tax margins
on manufactured consumer goods rather than to allow increases in productivity
in manufacturing to accrue as net enterprise revenue, and thus to appear in
budgetary sources as profits withdrawals. This may simply be a result of
budgetary inadvertance, but it may, on the contrary, reflect an ideological
preference. That is, the leadership may prefer to think of budgetary receipts
as mainly profits from state-owned enterprises, rather than as sales tax
revenue, collected so obviously from the population. In any event, the
structure of Soviet taxation today is dominated by profit withdrawals, and
the relative shift from the turnover tax to profit withdrawals as the main
budgetary source of funds has been accompanied by a shift (of uncertain
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dimensions) in the incidence of Soviet taxation. The poor pay less today,
relatively, than they did during rapid industrialization.
In general, the Soviet tax policy demonstrates the relevance of
Hinrichs' theory of tax structure change for socialist states undergoing
economic development. The Soviet case also illustrates the importance of
political and cultural biases in determxning tax structure, and more detailed
analysis of such biases ought to help to refine current theories of
taxation.
James R. Millar, Professor of Economics
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Donna Bahry, Asst. Professor of Political
Science, VPI
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